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Introduction
The recent economic crisis challenged the ability of national governments to guarantee economic stability and the sustainability of sovereign debt. There is empirical evidence that countries that do not have sound public finance, such as substantial fiscal deficit or an excessively high debt level, are likely to face higher risk premia required by financial market's participants (Schuknecht et al., 2009) . Since 2009 the spread between longterm government bond yields in some euro area countries vis-à-vis the German ones experienced not only a dramatic increase, but also an augmented differentiation among countries. Recent contributions show that the determinants of the recent widening of sovereign bond premia in euro area countries are related to both general factors, such as liquidity risk, international risk aversion and contagion effects, and country-specific factors, such as fiscal positions and macroeconomic fundamentals (Attinasi et al., 2011; Gerlach et al., 2010; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De Santis, 2012; Giordano et al., 2013) . De Grauwe and Ji (2012) argue that the recent movements of government bond yield differentials cannot be explained only using economic and financial determinants.
They show that the surge in the spreads of Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain in the period 2010-2011 was not linked to the underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios, but was connected to negative market sentiments.
A factor that could play an important role in driving sovereign spread movements is political communication. Although a formal definition seems to be difficult to provide, Denton and Woodward (1990) and McNair (2011) define political communication in a broad sense, as a discussion about the allocation of public resources with a particular emphasis on the purpose and intentionality of political actors in affecting the political environment. This includes discussions that are public and, therefore, could be related to public speeches, interviews and press releases. Clearly, mass media play an important role in transmitting political communication and thus making them public knowledge (Gade et al., 2013) . The provocative article "Loose lips sink the euro? " published in The
Economist on the 16th of September 2011 has increased the attention on the effects of political communication in the context of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
The financial market effects of statements made by politicians have been the objective of many recent studies. Carmassi and Micossi (2010) analyze critical changes in the 10-year government bond spread of Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and France versus Germany between December 2009 and June 2010, pointing out that communications by governments fueled the financial turmoil. In particular, the messages by policy-makers were not able to convince the markets about their ability to effectively address economic imbalances. Mohl and Sondermann (2013) consider news agency reports from May 2010 to June 2011, finding that a higher level of statements' frequency from different euro area governments generated an increase in the bond spreads. In addition, they show that statements from AAA-rated countries' politicians had a significant impact on sovereign bond spreads. Goldbach and Fahrholz (2011) assess whether political events that worsened the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact generated a shared default risk premium for euro area countries. They show that the European Commission played an important role in affecting investors' evaluations. The effects of European Central Bank (ECB) communications about unconventional measures on the Italian spread have been studied by Falagiarda and Reitz (2013) . They find that the announcements of these operations were able to reduce substantially the Italian long-term government bond yield spread relative to German counterparts during the recent euro area sovereign bond crisis. Gade et al. (2013) investigate the extent to which political communication, defined as "policy-makers' pronouncements on fiscal policy and public finance", had an impact on the sovereign bond spreads in euro area countries, showing that this effect is evident in Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
This paper intends to study the effects of political announcements by Italian government's members on the Italian sovereign bond spread, i.e. the differential between the Italian 10-year government bond yield and the German one. As depicted in Figure 1 , the Italian spread has experienced very high volatility between 2009 and 2013, increasing from around 140 basis points at the beginning of 2009 to more than 500 basis points at the peak of the sovereign bond crisis in 2011. It then declined to about 220 basis points at the end of 2013. As already mentioned, the volatility of sovereign risk is potentially connected to the ability of governments to address their duties in terms of sound public finance and debt obligations, and to provide credible long-term prospects. The recent Italian political experience motivates an intriguing comparison among the three different cabinets that followed one another during the period 2009-2013: Berlusconi's cabinet, in office until the 12th of November 2011, Monti's cabinet, in office until the 27th of April 2013, and Letta's cabinet. Therefore, it seems natural to conduct a comparative econometric analysis to assess the effectiveness of announcements by members of the three different administrations.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Our definition of announcement is consistent with Gade et al. (2013) and includes policy-makers' public pronouncements on fiscal policy and public finance. In order to collect and classify announcements, we rely on the ECB Real Time Information System, which includes public news media releases from the following agencies: Bloomberg, Reuters, Dow Jones Newswires and Market News International. Overall, our dataset consists of 197 announcements by Italian government members. We examine their effects on spread movements by using GARCH models to control for time-varying volatility.
The findings indicate that only fiscal policy announcements made by members of Monti's cabinet have been effective in influencing the Italian spread in the expected direction, revealing a remarkable lack of credibility for Berlusconi's and Letta's governments relative to Monti's technocratic administration.
1 Moreover, we check the robustness of the results by changing the set of controls and by using both the Italian 10-year government bond yields and the Italian credit default swap (CDS) spread as dependent variables.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the results, whereas robustness checks are conducted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1 An investigation of the factors that determined this credibility gap goes beyond the scope of this study. we collect all the announcements from Italian government members regarding fiscal policy and public finance from 2009 to 2013. Each announcement is judged in order to assess the direction of its effects on the Italian spread vis-à-vis Germany, and thus to determine the extent to which an announcement has its intended effects. Fiscal policy announcements are classified according to their content, and then coded on a numerical scale as follows: 
Econometric Model
In order to investigate the effect of fiscal policy announcements on the Italian spread, we need a tool capable of modeling the high time-varying volatility of the spread shown in Figure 1 . Therefore, a standard Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model, originally proposed by Bollerslev (1986) , is adopted. The conditional mean of the model is an augmented autoregressive process:
where ∆S t is the first difference of the spread between Italian and German 10-year government bond yields (Gerlach et al., 2010; Attinasi et al., 2011; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012) , DomGov t is our fiscal policy indicator, calculated as explained in the previous subsection, and X t is a vector of controls. Let the error process be such that
where ν t is an i.i.d. sequence with zero mean and σ 2 ν = 1. The conditional variance of ε t is modeled as an ARMA(1,1) process:
Consistently with previous works on the determinants of sovereign spreads, the vector of control variables X t contains: a) A volatility index for the euro area (EuroV IX t )
to control for financial turmoil, as in Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Glick and Leduc (2012) . We expect a positive relationship between ∆S t and ∆EuroV IX t . b) The total stock market index for the EU (EU DS t ) to control for market-wide business climate Issues of reverse causality potentially arising in Equation (2) are partially tackled by construction of the data, as in Gade et al. (2013) . While the data on yield spread are collected as end-of-day, the fiscal policy indicator is constructed on the basis of announcements made during the day, with news released in the evening recorded in the next trading day and news released during weekend days reported in the following Monday.
Thus, announcements on a specific day would always occur before the recording of the Italian sovereign yield spread.
Results
The goal of the paper is to check whether the effect on the Italian spread of fiscal policy announcements of the three cabinets that followed one another during the period 2009-2013 differs. To this purpose, the estimation is carried out over three different periods: Table 1 reports the parameter estimates of the GARCH model as in equation (2) and (3). For each administration, we specify four different models by adding progressively additional control variables. Ljung-Box (LB) Q-statistics are computed to test for autocorrelation in standardized and squared standardized residuals. The p-values of the calculated LB-Q values show that, in most cases, the null hypothesis of no-autocorrelation up to five and ten orders cannot be rejected. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the variance equation are statistically significant at conventional levels, 2 revealing clustering and long memory of the spread volatility. Therefore, the GARCH model is reasonably specified.
[ Table 1 giving to the government. Operationally, in Equation (2) we introduce one fiscal policy announcement indicator for each sub-period (DomGovP eriod1 and DomGovP eriod2). Table 2 reports the estimation results.
[ Table 2 about here]
The response of the Italian spread to announcements made by members of Berlusconi's cabinet does not change going from the first to the second sub-period, remaining statistically not significant. Therefore, the increase in the Italian sovereign spread volatility experienced in the mid of 2010 did not alter the ineffectiveness of government's fiscal policy announcements. Interestingly, the coefficients of the second sub-period of Monti's cabinet are larger and, in the last two specifications, even more statistically significant than those relative to the first sub-period. These findings suggest that Monti's cabinet seems to have been even more credible in the absence of Berlusconi's support. Regarding
Letta's government, we observe that the coefficients are not statistically significant in both periods, indicating that Berlusconi's decision to leave the majority did not generate any credibility gain for that government. These results seem to confirm the idea that a technocratic cabinet, like the Monti's one, is perceived as more credible in the eyes of market participants, at least in periods of severe sovereign debt tensions.
Split into Positive and Negative Announcements
Equation (2) is then estimated distinguishing positive and negative values of our fiscal policy indicator DomGov t to check whether announcements perceived as spread-reducing (DomGovP os t ) and those perceived as spread-increasing (DomGovN eg t ) have had a different impact on the Italian sovereign spread. The findings, shown in Table 3 , indicate that for Berlusconi's and Letta's government (in the latter case only in the last two specifications) the split into positive and negative announcements does not matter, as both DomGovP os t and DomGovN eg t are never statistically significant. Looking at Monti's cabinet, the coefficients of both spread-reducing and spread-increasing announcements are statistically significant in all specifications and their sign is as expected. Therefore, both components contribute to the statistically significant estimates of the baseline regression shown in Table 1 .
[ Table 3 about here]
Robustness Checks
The results discussed in Section 3 turned out to be robust to different model specifications.
To further check the robustness of the results, we estimate the model using the Italian 10-year government bond yield (Y t ) as dependent variable in place of the spread. Six lags of the regressand are now added to remove autocorrelation of the residuals. 3 The results, displayed in Tables 4-6 , generally confirm what found in Section 3. More specifically, announcements by Monti's government are effective in influencing Italian long-term bond yields (Table 4 ) and Monti's cabinet seems to gain further credibility in the second subperiod (Table 5) . However, when splitting positive and negative announcements (Table   6 ), spread-increasing announcements made by members of Monti's cabinet are no longer significant at conventional levels in three specifications, suggesting that spread-reducing announcements have been probably more influential in affecting yield movements.
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Conclusions
The study carried out in this paper highlights the importance of political communication in influencing sovereign bond spreads. Specifically, we focus on Italian policy-makers' public pronouncements on fiscal policy and public finance, relying on news media releases from major news agencies. We perform an econometric comparative analysis between the three Italian cabinets that followed one another during the period 2009-2013, assigning a negative (positive) values to announcements that are perceived to reduce (increase) the spread, whereas a zero is assigned to announcements that are perceived as neutral. We show that during Berlusconi's and Letta's administrations fiscal policy announcements are not statistically significant. By contrast, the announcements made by members of Monti's cabinet had a significant effect on the Italian spread in the expected direction. These findings indicate a remarkable credibility gap between Monti's technocratic administration and Berlusconi's and Letta's governments.
They are not reported here, but are available upon request from the authors. 
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